

Discussion of *Crashes and Collateralized Lending* by Jakub Jurek and Erik Stafford

Chris Rogers

Statistical Laboratory, University of Cambridge

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Do we need to be using such an involved description?

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
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
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


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


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because $C'(K) = -e^{-rT} \mathbb{P}(K < V_T)$

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
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None of this requires any distributional assumptions about V .

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A CDO tranche with attachment points $0 < a < b < 1$ will deliver


$$\frac{1}{b - a} \left\{ \left(\frac{\Psi(w_T)}{\bar{D}} - (1 - b) \right)^+ \wedge (b - a) \right\}$$

at time T .

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Credit spread vs leverage of bond-issuing firms
Sigma = 0.4, $r = 0.05$, $T = 1$, recovery = 0.6
Lower attachment point = 7%, upper = 10%, beta = 0.2



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